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through it one comes into close touch with a remarkable group, the men and women whom he especially cherished, Robert Gould Shaw, John M. Forbes, and Henry Lee Higginson, his intimate friends, Mrs. Anne Jackson Lowell, his mother, and Mrs. Josephine Shaw Lowell, his wife.

J. K. HOSMER.

*Military Memoirs of a Confederate. A Critical Narrative.* By E. P. ALEXANDER. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1907. Pp. xviii, 634.)

THE author of this work is an educated soldier, a graduate of West Point, had much experience in the field before the Civil War, served in the Confederate army, most of the time under Longstreet, and had exceptional opportunities to acquaint himself with inside facts, all of which, added to his fairness, qualified him to write a critical narrative of the campaigns of the Army of Northern Virginia. He criticises alike Confederate friend and Federal foe, the justice of which, in some cases, may be disputed, but the good temper shown must be conceded.

He errs in throwing upon Patterson the entire blame for permitting Joseph E. Johnston to join Beauregard at Manassas, when General Scott should share the censure. He criticises the slowness, irresolution, and strategy of McDowell in the Bull Run campaign of July, 1861; holds that on the field his tactics were "poor and timid", and apparently adopts the view that a vigorous pursuit by 5,000 fresh Confederates of the panic-stricken Federals would have taken Washington next day, and that the fruits of victory were thrown away because Jefferson Davis and the two generals spent the few hours of remaining daylight in aimlessly riding over the battlefield.

General Huger has been held responsible for Confederate failure at Seven Pines, May 31, 1862; Alexander relieves him of that long borne burden and puts it on the shoulders of Johnston and Longstreet, saying of the first that "his efforts to handle the army in battle had been an utter failure", and his serious wounding on the field a distinct gain to the Confederate cause, as it brought General Lee to the front, and greatly increased the chances of a successful campaign against McClellan. Yet the first campaign conducted by Lee was marked by many grave errors, the first of which was in sending Stuart, June 11, 1862, on a reconnoissance to McClellan's rear, thus putting him on his guard and causing him to prepare for a change of base to James River. Lee permitted his lieutenants to open the battle of Mechanicsville or Beaver Dam before Jackson had come within supporting distance, and threw small detachments against the strongest parts of the Federal line, only to be bloodily repulsed, giving Longstreet an opportunity to write, "Next to Malvern Hill the sacrifice at Beaver Dam was unequaled in demoralization during the entire summer." At Gaines's Mill the battle seems to have been left in the hands of the division commanders until

it was nearly lost, and only at the last moment did Lee make his presence felt, and it was then too late to destroy Porter's corps. Lee's pursuit of McClellan is open to criticism, and his ill-advised order to attack at Malvern Hill brought upon him a terrible repulse; but here our critic has light censure. Jackson is justly criticised for his part in the Peninsular campaign. He failed to come up in time at Beaver Dam; he was so tardy at Gaines's Mill that not more than half a Confederate victory was won, when Porter should have been annihilated; he dawdled before Franklin's position at White Oak Creek crossing, losing an entire day; he took no initiative at Malvern Hill, and "had he been the Jackson of the Valley . . . he would have turned Malvern Hill by the left and taken position commanding the road somewhere beyond Turkey Creek". His ardent admirers excuse him on the ground of physical exhaustion due to the excessive labor of previous days, but our critic cites evidence to show that he was not disposed to expose his own men, but would be content to have others do the fighting, and gives a camp rumor that Jackson had said he "did not intend that his men should do all the fighting".

Of McClellan it is said that he was unfit for the command of an army; was wanting in "enterprise and audacity", and that the army fought better without him than with him, but it is admitted that he had no superior in organizing an army to take the field.

In the campaign against Pope, culminating in the Second Manassas, Alexander commends the audacity of Lee, gives some censure to Pope, part of which should have been directed to Halleck, and believes that one of the best fruits of Confederate victory on the field of Manassas was the court-martial of Fitz-John Porter, an officer of the highest type, and his dismissal from the Federal service.

The result of the campaign gave the Confederates an opportunity to send one-half of Lee's army by railroad to Chattanooga to aid Bragg in his campaign in Kentucky. Alexander thinks that such a movement would have been a profitable utilization of "Interior Lines" and would have borne better fruit than an invasion of Maryland, but Lee thought otherwise and promptly crossed the Potomac to tempt fate. It would have been a disastrous step had McClellan showed enterprise. Lee's wide dispersion of his army is criticised, and his audacity in doing so admired. McClellan lost his campaign by not swiftly pushing his army through Crampton's Gap of South Mountain, where he should have gone in person. Of Antietam, or Sharpsburg, correctly characterized as "the boldest and the bloodiest battle ever fought upon this continent", our critic intimates that the Confederates were reinforced on the field by the actual presence of McClellan himself with his army, which he handled feebly, though the fighting of his men was superb. Lee's giving battle with the Potomac at his back is condemned; McClellan lost a great opportunity in not destroying him.

Of Burnside it is held that he began his campaign with a blunder

in not making Lee's army his objective, instead of a movement on Fredericksburg. Of his conduct of the battle of Fredericksburg, it is enough to say that he gave confused orders to Franklin on the left, and made a "fatal mistake" in assaulting Marye's Heights. His withdrawal in the face of a victorious enemy "was a great feat", reflecting badly upon the vigilance of the Confederates.

Hooker's strategy at the opening of the Chancellorsville campaign, by which he manoeuvred Lee out of Fredericksburg is commended, and, contrary to general opinion, he is justified in falling back to his intrenched line around Chancellorsville on the first day when he saw that Lee was in motion to attack him. Our critic comes to the relief of the men of the 11th corps, attacked as they were "no troops could have acted differently". The recall of Sickles on the morning of the second day from the Hazel Grove position is put down as a "fatal mistake" on Hooker's part, "there has rarely been a more gratuitous gift of a battlefield". The decision to recross the river was the mistake of Hooker's life.

The victory at Chancellorsville presented the Confederates an opportunity for the use of interior lines to relieve Vicksburg and recoup affairs in the West by sending a column to Knoxville or Chattanooga, and threaten Kentucky. Such a campaign had been suggested by Longstreet, and Lee recognized the possibility of its success, but decided upon an invasion of Pennsylvania, believing that a victory there would recall Federal troops from the West and thus relieve Vicksburg and keep Rosecrans on the defensive. Lee's first great blunder of the Gettysburg campaign was in making it at all, and the second was the disposition made of Stuart's cavalry. After the two armies had come in collision at Gettysburg and Lee had hammered Meade into his strong position, Longstreet proposed to move around Meade's left, force him from position, and make him fight at a disadvantage, but Lee determined to attack Meade next day in position. Alexander disposes of the unjust criticism that Longstreet failed to obey Lee's order to attack early on the second day; condemns Sickles's advance to the Peach Orchard and gives a soldier's appreciation of Meade's foresight and tactics in bringing troops from every part of his line to the threatened point, in these words, "There was not during the war a finer example of efficient command than that displayed by Meade on this occasion." He holds that the conduct of the battle by the Confederates on the second day was "conspicuously bad", and strongly censures Ewell. On the third day, failing to recognize the weakest point of Meade's line—Cemetery Hill—Lee ordered an assault on Meade's left centre, and its execution with a column of 15,000 men, led by Pickett, was left to Longstreet. Alexander, who was Longstreet's chief of artillery, was to silence Meade's artillery and prepare the way for the assault; he was also to determine the proper moment for Pickett to advance. Fully convinced of the hopelessness of the

assault Longstreet tried in vain to avert a useless slaughter, saying as he stood with Alexander among his guns, "I do not want to make this charge, I do not see how it can succeed. I would not make it now but that General Lee has ordered it and is expecting it." Pickett led his column forward, the result was as Longstreet feared, and Lee said to the fugitives as they came back, "It was my fault this time." The critics of Longstreet will get no consolation from the pages treating of Gettysburg. Alexander believes that had Meade sent forward at this time a single fresh Union corps, say the sixth, it would have cut the Confederate army in two, and adds: "It must be ever held a colossal mistake that Meade did not organize a counter-stroke as soon as he discovered that the Confederate attack had been repulsed. He lost here an opportunity as great as McClellan had at Sharpsburg." He lost a still greater opportunity when he failed to press Lee relentlessly on his retreat to the Potomac.

In the Wilderness campaign Lee displayed "masterly generalship", and our author thinks Grant would have been utterly destroyed on the first day but for the wounding of Longstreet. He credits Grant with having completely deceived Lee as to his whereabouts for three days after withdrawing from Cold Harbor, and admits that the crossing of the James was well planned and successfully conducted, and holds that the movement on Petersburg was the real crisis of the war.

Space does not permit a satisfactory review of this book; to be appreciated it must be read. It professes to be written particularly for military students, but will be found of great interest to the general reader. The narrative is clear and concise, praise is worthily bestowed and criticism generally well taken and temperate. To some of the extremely critical it will be disappointing, in that the maps are not as good and as full as they should be, and foot-notes are wanting to show the authority upon which some novel statements are made.

E. A. CARMAN.

*Documentary History of Reconstruction.* Volume II. By WALTER L. FLEMING, Ph.D., Professor of History in West Virginia University. (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company. 1907. Pp. xiv, 480.)

IN the April number the first volume of Professor Fleming's *Documentary History* was reviewed. The volume closed with the completion of legal Reconstruction by the restoration of the lately seceded states to their constitutional position in the Union and by the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the latter a fitting climax to the Congressional policy of Reconstruction. In the volume now under discussion it is intended to illustrate how this policy succeeded, to show it, no longer as a theory and an expedient of politicians, but in actual operation. Consequently the